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ADMINISTRATIVE APPARITION: RESURRECTING THE
MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE’S LEGITIMACY
CRISIS WITH AGENCY LAW ANALYSIS
Tabitha M. Kempf+
There is an enduring discord among academic and political pundits over the
state of modern American government, with much focus on the ever-expanding
host of federal agencies and their increasing regulatory, investigative,
enforcement, and adjudicatory authority. The growing conglomerate of federal
agencies, often unfavorably regarded as the “administrative state,” has invited
decades of debate over the validity and proper scope of this current mode of
government. Advocates for and against the administrative state are numerous,
with most making traditional constitutional arguments to justify or delegitimize
the current establishment. Others make philosophical, moral, or practical
arguments in support or opposition. Though some contest it, the administrative
state faces a crisis of legitimacy. This article addresses what is described here
as the “Approval Defense,” an argument that justifies the administrative state
on grounds that, even if unconstitutional, all three branches of federal
government and the public have subsequently approved of our modern form of
government, so it is legitimate on that basis. In essence, the Approval Defense’s
claim of legitimacy is one of ratification. Using similar agency law principles,
this article seeks to demonstrate the flaws with a justification based on
ratification and show that until there has been an adequate explanation of its
lawful basis, the administrative state’s legitimacy crisis will simply not go to its
grave.
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INTRODUCTION
There is an enduring discord among academic and political pundits over the
state of modern American government, with much of the contention around its
legal basis and apparent need for reform.1 Specifically, debate continues over
the legitimacy of the ever-expanding host of federal administrative agencies—
often unfavorably regarded as the “administrative state”—and skepticism
persists over these agencies’ increasing amounts of regulatory, investigative,
enforcement, and adjudicatory authority.2 With the U.S. Constitution serving as
1. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE DUBIOUS MORALITY OF MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9–
18 (2020) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, DUBIOUS MORALITY].
2. The term “Administrative State,” mostly used by detractors of the regime, generally refers
to the collection of federal executive branch agencies “exercising the power to create, adjudicate,
and enforce their own rules” in their charge to regulate specific areas of the American social order.
BALLOTPEDIA, Administrative State, https://ballotpedia.org/Administrative_state (last visited Oct.
18, 2020). State agencies may also be included in the scope of the “Administrative State,”
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the structural blueprint for our American system of government, the fight over
the administrative state’s legitimacy has primarily, and quite naturally, taken
constitutional form.3 However, to comprehend the scope and intensity of the
present discussion, it is important to recognize that this decades-long debate is
not simply an academic escapade into the interstices of constitutional law
doctrine. The primary reason the debate has endured and is so contentious is
that the administrative state’s legitimacy seems to be one of the primary venues
for the ongoing Conservative-Progressive debate over the proper purpose and
format of government.4 In other words, it is a venue for debate over political
theory. Controversy also arises over the administrative state’s perceived value,
or detriment, to the American public.5 At the outset then, it must be noted that
the administrative state debate consists not only of constitutionally derived
arguments, but also those of deeply philosophical, theoretical, practical, and
moral arguments about how, and on what basis, society should be organized.6
This article does not respond to or analyze the mainstream constitutional
arguments for and against the administrative state. Instead of wielding the usual
constitutional law and doctrinal arguments, the article addresses a single agency
law-derived defense of the modern administrative state, then uses those same
agency law principles to analyze whether such an argument for legitimacy is
viable. In doing so, this article’s small task is to confront yet another defense of
the administrative state and, hopefully, add one non-traditional arrow to the
quiver of those in the anti-administrativist camp who still have a long fight ahead
of them in the effort to slay this administrative behemoth.
Part I introduces the modern administrative state and provides a brief
overview of its historic and contentious discourse, laying out a high-level view
of the opposing sides. Part II describes a single argument in support of the
depending on usage; but for purposes of this article, the term will refer solely to federal government
agencies, broadly defined.
3. See infra Part I.
4. Particular philosophical arguments about the proper function of government, quite
obviously, gave rise to the birth of the nation but have evolved drastically over time, with a drastic
shift in ideologies occurring at the early twentieth century dawn of the Progressive Era. See
generally THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James
Madison); WOODROW WILSON, What is Progress? in THE NEW FREEDOM: A CALL FOR THE
EMANCIPATION OF THE GENEROUS ENERGIES OF A PEOPLE 33–54 (1913). This change in political
theory, while widely adopted—as evidenced in the explosion of the administrative state and
popularity of Progressive political platform—has also roused a Conservative philosophical
response. Jonathan O’Neill, The First Conservatives: The Constitutional Challenge to
Progressivism, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 39 FIRST PRINCIPLES SERIES 1–3 (July 5, 2011),
https://www.heritage.org/political-process/report/the-first-conservatives-the-constitutionalchallenge-progressivism. Hence the ongoing debate. And while this article’s scope does not
include any in-depth discussion of the political theories that form the basis of this ongoing debate,
simply recognizing that these clashing theories underlie the opposing arguments may be helpful for
finding one’s bearings within the conversation.
5. See infra notes 17–22 and accompanying text.
6. See supra note 5; see infra note 24 and accompanying text.

380

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 71:377

administrative state’s legitimacy—what is herein referred to as the “Approval
Defense.” Part III sets up the contextual framework of the article by articulating
and then applying basic agency law principles to modern American government,
thus framing the conversation about the administrative state in agency law terms.
Part IV analyzes the Approval Defense, arguing that it is essentially one of
ratification, and then critiques the defense’s theory of and purported evidence of
ratification. Ultimately, by applying agency law principles to the problem, this
article argues that an assertion of the administrative state’s legitimacy on the
grounds that it has been ratified by the State and the general public violates basic
agency law principles, lacks sufficient evidence, and is therefore ultimately
unpersuasive.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE AND RELATED
ACADEMIC DISCOURSE
To understand the fervency of the ongoing administrative state debate, it may
be helpful to review the basic contours of the modern-day administrative regime.
A few facts are particularly insightful. As an initial matter, the United States
federal government is—to some, alarmingly—so large that it is unquantifiable.
There is no authoritative count of how many federal agencies currently exist—
even from the federal agency specifically tasked with promoting the
administrative regime’s fairness and efficiency.7 Equally astounding is the total
costs associated with the administrative state, which amount to thirty percent of
the entire U.S. economy’s spending.8 This fiscal burden arises, in part, from the
nearly incalculable number of annually enacted federal regulations, all of which
hold legal implications for the public. In a light regulatory output year,
collectively federal agencies enact “only” about three-thousand final rules, or

7. See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, About,
https://www.acus.gov/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2021); David E. Lewis & Jennifer L. Selin, Sourcebook
of United States Executive Agencies, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 14–
15 (2012), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Sourcebook%202012%20FIN
paraAL_May%202013.pdf (“[T]here is no authoritative list of government agencies.”). Part of the
difficulty might stem from the lack of any formally recognized definition of the term “agency.”
See, e.g., Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“The statutory definition of
‘agency’ is not entirely clear, but the APA apparently confers agency status on any administrative
unit with substantial independent authority in the exercise of specific functions.”); see Lewis &
Selin, supra, at 13–16 (explaining that neither government, the courts, nor regulated parties know
how to define the term “agency” as used by the Administrative Procedure Act).
8. Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., Ten Thousand Commandments: An Annual Snapshot of the
Federal Regulatory State, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, 3 (2020), https://cei.org/sites/
default/files/Ten_Thousand_Commandments_2018.pdf. For additional statistics, see id. (noting
that “[i]f it were a country, U.S. regulation would be the world’s eighth-largest economy [not
counting the U.S. itself], ranking behind India and ahead of Italy” and costing the average American
household more than it spends on “health care, food, transportation, entertainment, apparel,
services, and savings,” among other facts).
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approximately seventy-thousand pages of regulatory content every year.9 For
reference, that number exceeds Congress’s annual bipartisan legislative output
by twenty-eight times.10 As the Department of Justice put it, “today, an entire
regulatory apparatus lays claim to an extraordinary amount of private resources,
imposing costs that are as consequential as the costs of taxes for the private
parties who must bear them.”11
But the administrative state is not controversial merely for its size, regulatory
output, or corresponding fiscal burden imposed on the American public. With
so many regulations enacted each year, private citizens’ and corporations’ risk
of facing a federal investigation, enforcement action, or lawsuit is
proportionately enlarged.12 And not just theoretically. In fact, “[a]gencies now
adjudicate most of the legal disputes in the federal system. A citizen is ten times
more likely to be tried by an agency than by an actual court.”13 And this statistic
is concerning because administrative adjudications are not, in practice, subject
to all the same constitutional protections otherwise afforded to defendants in a
traditional Article III court.14 Notwithstanding one’s constitutional or
philosophical objections to the administrative state, that Americans are
increasingly subject to myriad rules and regulations issued by an unquantifiable
conglomerate of federal agencies that exact astonishing amounts of public
resources and impose civil and criminal sanctions—in some instances for

9. Id. at 4, 8; see id. at 25 fig. 9. And these numbers say nothing of the “non-binding”
guidance documents and “informal” regulatory statements the agencies put out each year.
10. Id. at 4. For an immediate count on the number of promulgated and pending federal
regulations, see BALLOTPEDIA, The Administrative State Project, https://ballotpedia.org/The_
Administrative_State_Project (last visited Oct. 18, 2020).
11. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., MODERNIZING THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 2 (2020),
https://www.justice.gov/file/1302321/download.
12. For an alarming, and entertaining, education into just how absurdly riddled the average
American’s day-to-day existence is with still-valid federal regulations carrying the threat of
criminal sanctions, see MIKE CHASE, HOW TO BECOME A FEDERAL CRIMINAL: AN ILLUSTRATED
HANDBOOK FOR THE ASPIRING OFFENDER (2019).
13. The Administrative State: An Examination of Federal Rulemaking: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov. Affs., 114th Cong. 52 (2016) (statement of Jonathan Turley,
Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law, The George Washington University Law School),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114shrg23705/pdf/CHRG-114shrg23705.pdf.
14. See generally Todd Gaziano, et al., The Regulatory State’s Due Process Deficits: Nine
Case Studies Highlight the Most Common Agency Failings, https://pacificlegal.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/05/The-Regulatory-State%E2%80%99s-Due-Process-Deficits-May2020.pdf (last visited July 14, 2020) (illustrating the multiple ways in which agency adjudications
fail to satisfy basic due process requirements).
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completely innocuous behavior15—is enough to raise a raucous debate. And it
has.16
The controversy over the administrative state’s legitimacy is a historic battle
that began well over a century ago with the Progressive push for a modern, less
constitutionally-constrained form of government.17 The fight, having its
apparent apex in the mid-1930s Supreme Court revolution,18 has garnered
immense controversy that persists to this day at the highest levels of legal
academia and political discourse.19 On one side of the divide are those who
generally favor the current administrative arrangement, who defend its
legitimacy as necessary for regulating a complex society, for its benefit to the
public welfare, and who dismiss its constitutional critiques on the grounds that
the nondelegation doctrine is unmoored from any legitimate constitutional
interpretation.20 On the other side stand the opponents of the administrative
regime, who generally fall somewhere along the classical liberal spectrum and
have kept the debate alive despite their challengers’ desire to “put [it] to rest
15. See, e.g., A Crime a Day (@CrimeADay), TWITTER (July 6, 2020, 10:09 PM),
https://twitter.com/CrimeADay/status/1280323075439984640 (“21 USC §§610, 676 & 9 CFR
§319.306 make it a federal crime to sell spaghetti with meatballs and sauce without prominently
declaring the presence of the sauce.”).
16. EPSTEIN, DUBIOUS MORALITY, supra note 1, at 9–18; Philip Wallach, The Administrative
State’s Legitimacy Crisis, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Apr. 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/
research/the-administrative-states-legitimacy-crisis/; Adrian Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?
(May 9, 2016), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2016/05/09/adrian-vermeule/what-legitimacycrisis.
17. PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 16 (2014); WILSON, supra
note 4, at 33–54.
18. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION 1–3
(2006).
19. EPSTEIN, DUBIOUS MORALITY, supra note 1, at 9–18.
20. EPSTEIN, DUBIOUS MORALITY, supra note 1, at 9–18.; HAMBURGER, IS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 17, at 16–19; Woodrow Wilson, The Study of
Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q., 197, 199–201 (1887), https://www.jstor.org/stable/2139277
(making the foundational Progressive argument for the necessity of administrative government in
an increasingly complex society); Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, supra note 16 (pointing to
some evidence that suggests the administrative state supports robust societal-level happiness and
greater general welfare); Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding,
121 COLUMBIA L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 1) (https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3512154) (refuting the claim that the nondelegation doctrine inheres
in the Constitution); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Morality of Administrative Law,
131 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1928 (2018) (“Some versions of this concern have rested on novel
constitutional theories, often rooted in controversial understandings of Articles I, II, and III.”);
Keith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L. REV.
379, 380–81 (2017) (challenging the “narrative” that the nondelegation doctrine ever served as a
valid check on Congressional delegations of power); Adrian Vermeule, ‘No’ Review of Philip
Hamburger, ‘Is Administrative Law Unlawful?’, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1547, 1548, 1556 (2015)
(reviewing PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2012)) (considering the
nondelegation doctrine a “legal fiction”); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1722 (2002) (“[T]here just is no constitutional
nondelegation rule, nor has there ever been.”).
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once and for all, in an unmarked grave.”21 As noted at the outset, in addition to
pragmatic considerations, these anti-administrativist critics raise a host of
constitutional challenges, arguing among other things “that administrative law
violates the separation of powers, bicameralism, due process, judicial
independence, and jury rights.”22 All of these constitutionally derived
arguments are vital to the critique of the administrative state and serve as the
locus of the debate. But again, this article will not follow in that usual
constitutional vein of analysis. Instead, this article focuses on a single defense
of the administrative state—one that essentially lays aside the constitutional
question and grounds its theory of legitimacy in assertions of widespread State
and public approval—and addresses that argument on those terms. To that
argument we now turn.
II. THE APPROVAL DEFENSE: DO STATE AND PUBLIC APPROVAL LEGITIMIZE
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE?
Amidst all the clamor of this legitimacy crisis,23 arguments for and against the
administrative state seem to crop up in any place the seeds of discourse might
scatter. These arguments most frequently arise in the constitutional context, but
also find their bases in political theory, morality, or pure pragmatism.24 One
such argument—which has found its way into the crosshairs of this particular
author’s analytical sights—will be called here the “Approval Defense” for its
central assertion that widespread State and public approval is what legitimizes
the administrative state, notwithstanding constitutional objections.25 Perhaps
because it is not situated within the common constitutional framework for debate
21. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 20, at 1723; HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
UNLAWFUL?, supra note 17, at 15.
22. HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 17, at 15–16 (citing
several influential scholars who have challenged the unconstitutionality of the administrative state
including, among others, Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation
Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297 (2003); Bradford Clark,
Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001); Gary Lawson,
The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994); DAVID
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE
THROUGH DELEGATION 13 (1993); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY,
POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 143–44 (1969)).
23. Which, it should be noted, its existence some flatly deny and others consider an
embarrassment. See Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, supra note 16; Cynthia R. Farina, The
Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987,
987 (1997).
24. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN & ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND LEVIATHAN: REDEEMING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 1–3 (2020).
25. See Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, supra note 16; see also SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE,
supra note 24, at 143–44; see also Cynthia R. Farina, The Administrative State and the Constitution:
Deconstructing Nondelegation, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 101–02 (2010) [hereinafter
Farina, Deconstructing Nondelegation] (making arguments that rely similarly on public opinion as
grounds for the administrative state’s legitimacy).
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or because it is still fairly juvenile in its development—appearing briefly in only
a handful of places—the Approval Defense is not yet a dominant theory
proffered in support of the modern federal government’s validity.26 But even if
not yet a prominent defense, it still holds great potential influence in both the
academy and the court of public opinion. This article seeks to analyze the
defense’s viability before it gets that far.
The Approval Defense, in very basic form, can be summarized as follows: (1)
assuming the administrative state’s constitutional legitimacy is even open to
question, (2) the State—through its combined, historic and collectively
bipartisan acts of Congress, the Presidency, and the Courts—gave birth to and
continues to validate the administrative state’s existence; (3) moreover, the
public has widely “approved” of the administrative state in its current
formulation; thus, the combination of State and public approval serves to
legitimize the administrative state and cure any constitutional infirmity it might
otherwise suffer.27 This argument is primarily, though not exclusively,
advocated by Professor Adrian Vermeule.28 Importantly, it is worth noting that
Professor Vermeule does not concede the initial component of the Approval
Defense outlined above—namely, that the question of the administrative state’s
constitutionality is open to debate.29 In fact, he makes the opposite argument
based on a particular conception of nondelegation, that, while not the focus of
this article, must be addressed briefly below.30
A. Nondelegation & The Approval Defense: The Constitution is No Bar
One of the central issues to any discussion of the administrative state is that
of the “nondelegation doctrine.”31 This issue is key because critics of the
administrative state find much of the force of their arguments in the assertion
that Congress has unlawfully delegated its own powers to the executive branch
26. See supra note 25.
27. Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, supra note 16; Farina, Deconstructing
Nondelegation, supra note 25; see also, SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE, supra note 24, at 143 (“In
contemporary government, federal and state agencies are arguably products of democratic will
(acknowledging the role of self-interested private groups).”).
28. See supra note 25.
29. Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, supra note 16.
30. Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, supra note 16.
31. Ballotpedia’s coverage of The Administrative State, a useful introductory resource for
those new to administrative law, identifies the “five pillars” of the administrative state: (1)
nondelegation, (2) judicial deference, (3) executive control of agencies, (4) procedural rights, and
The
Administrative
State
Project,
(5)
agency
dynamics.
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/The_Administrative_State_Project (last visited Oct. 18, 2020). See also
Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, supra note 16 (“Three concepts are indispensable to any
discussion of a putative “legitimacy crisis” in the administrative state: delegation [being one].”);
Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 330 (2002). Put in more
poetic, albeit skeptical, fashion: “If Academy Awards were given in constitutional jurisprudence,
nondelegation claims against regulatory statutes would win the prize for Most Sympathetic Judicial
Rhetoric in a Hopeless Case.” Farina, Deconstructing Nondelegation, supra note 25, at 87.
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agencies.32 The scholarly body of literature on this doctrine is enormous and
beyond the scope of this article. But given the doctrine’s centrality to the
discourse on the administrative state, a few words on the subject are necessary.
In simplistic terms, the nondelegation doctrine—understood in constitutional
and administrative law as an interpretation of the Article I vesting clause, which
rests on a strong theoretical conception of the separation of powers—is this:
Congress is clearly vested with legislative power by the People and, as such,
may not delegate this prescribed authority to other governmental branches or
entities.33 With its locus in interpretive methodology and separation of powers
analysis, defenders of the administrative state quite naturally take issue with the
doctrine on these constitutionally derived grounds. There is, however, a faction
of scholars from both sides of the administrative state debate who propose a shift
away from such constitutionally based doctrinal analysis of nondelegation.34
32. See, e.g., William Turton, How Our Administrative State Undermines the Constitution,
THE FEDERALIST (Feb. 8, 2019), https://thefederalist.com/2019/02/08/administrative-stateundermines-constitution/ (“Congress abandoned its legislative function and delegated its legislative
powers to the unelected bureaucracy.”).
33. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States[.]”); Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 20, at 388–90, 415;
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 20; HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra
note 17, at 16 ; see generally Posner & Vermeule, supra note 20; BALLOTPEDIA, Nondelegation
Doctrine, https://ballotpedia.org/Nondelegation_doctrine (last visited Oct. 20, 2020);
Nondelegation Doctrine, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/nondelegation_doctrine#:~:text=Overview,agencies%20or%20to%20private%20organizatio
ns (last visited Oct. 20, 2020).
34. HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 17, at 378 (“[I]t is
utterly misleading to frame the debate in terms of ‘the nondelegation doctrine,’ let alone its death.”);
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 20, at 1722 (“[T]here just is no constitutional nondelegation rule,
nor has there ever been. The nondelegation position lacks any foundation in constitutional text and
structure, in standard originalist sources, or in sound economic and political theory. Nondelegation
is nothing more than a controversial theory[.]”); see generally Farina, Deconstructing
Nondelegation, supra note 25. Professor Philip Hamburger, among the most prominent figures of
modern administrative skepticism, proposes a departure from excessive focus on the nondelegation
doctrine. HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra. The term “administrative
skepticism” is Jeffrey Pajonowski’s. See Jeffrey A. Pajonowski, Neoclassical Administrative Law,
133 HARV. L. REV. 852, 869 (2020) (classifying views standing in opposition to the current mode
of government as “administrative skepticism”). Because there is current academic gridlock on the
question of nondelegation, Professor Hamburger suggests an approach that requires thinking in the
precise terms presented in the Constitution’s text and focuses discourse on the meaning of “vesting”
rather than “delegation.” See generally, Philip Hamburger, Delegating or Divesting?, 115
NORTHWESTERN L. REV. 88, 108 (2020), https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1292&context=nulr_online. This makes sense given the latter term’s
conspicuous absence from the constitutional text. Id. But even some who stridently oppose
Hamburger’s broader view on the administrative state agree with him on this point. See Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 20, at 1721–23; see generally Farina, Deconstructing Nondelegation, supra
note 25. Professor Cynthia Farina, an academic of opposite persuasion with respect to the
administrative state, suggests that confining discourse on the nondelegation doctrine to its purely
constitutional framework is ultimately ineffective. Farina, Deconstructing Nondelegation, supra
note 25, at 87–91. Instead, Professor Farina argues that nondelegation—itself a derivative of
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This article follows that suggested path forward. Thus, any discussion of
nondelegation in subsequent Parts refers to the principle of agency law rather
than the traditionally stated constitutional doctrine.35
In tandem with his arguments that form the basis of the Approval Defense,
Professor Vermeule makes two preliminary constitutional nondelegation
doctrine arguments.36 First, he argues that the nondelegation doctrine is a “legal
fiction,” meaning it is an interpretive theory with no valid basis in the
Constitution’s text or in historic constitutional law jurisprudence.37 Second,
Congress does not actually “delegate” legislative authority to administrative
agencies in the first instance; rather, by creating federal agencies, Congress
merely exerts its own legislative authority to statutorily empower agencies to
exercise executive authority.38 Thus, while agencies possess powers that look
legislative in nature—e.g., rulemaking authority—Congress is not actually
“delegating” any of its own vested powers.39
As noted above, a substantive response to Professor Vermeule’s
nondelegation arguments would require discussion of historic constitutional
general agency law principles—should be analyzed from within that framework rather than its
constitutionally-tethered form. Farina, Deconstructing Nondelegation, supra note 25, at 91–95
(analyzing nondelegation from purely agency law principles and concluding that challenges to the
administrative state on these grounds are unjustified).
35. Use of the terms “nondelegation” or “delegation” will be used in connection with the
principle, while any combination with the term “doctrine” will connote its well-defined
constitutional heritage.
36. See generally Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, supra note 16.
37. SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE, supra note 24, at 119–21 (arguing the nondelegation doctrine
“lacks anything like secure constitutional roots”); Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, supra note
16; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 20, at 1722 (“[T]here just is no constitutional nondelegation
rule, nor has there ever been. The nondelegation position lacks any foundation in constitutional
text and structure, in standard originalist sources, or in sound economic and political theory.”). Nor
is Professor Vermeule alone in his view of the nondelegation issue. See supra note 20. But because
the nondelegation issue is not central to the Approval Defense, as presented here, this article will
only briefly address it and, again, leaves the substantive constitutionally-derived analysis of the
administrative state’s legitimacy to the legion of academic scholars who have been engaged in the
debate for decades or longer. See supra notes 17–19. For more reading on the nondelegation
doctrine and traditional constitutional arguments regarding the administrative state’s legitimacy,
the author suggests interested readers refer to those scholars identified in notes 20 and 22; see also
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 20, at 1 (refuting the claim that the nondelegation doctrine inheres
in the Constitution); Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 20, at 380–81 (challenging the “narrative”
that the nondelegation doctrine ever served as a valid check on Congressional delegations of
power); Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, “The Nondelegation Doctrine is a Fable,”
THE ATLANTIC (May 26, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/
nondelegation-doctrine-orliginalism/612013/ (picking up on, in contemporary media, the recent
scholarship that attacks the nondelegation doctrine).
38. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 20, at 1723 (“A statutory grant of authority to the
executive isn’t a transfer of legislative power, but an exercise of legislative power. Conversely,
agents acting within the terms of such a statutory grant are exercising executive power, not
legislative power.”).
39. Id.
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doctrine and both originalist and non-originalist interpretative methodologies
and is therefore well beyond this article’s limited scope.40 At first glance,
Professor Vermeule’s claim that Congress is not actually delegating
“legislative” power might strike one as pure semantic chicanery, which some
have argued.41 In any event, for purposes of this article it will have to suffice to
note that his nondelegation arguments are highly contested.42
B. State and Public Approval as the Basis of Legitimacy
Nondelegation aside, Professor Vermeule puts forward his Approval Defense
as grounds for the administrative state’s legitimacy; namely, that—through the
working together of all its coordinate branches—Congress, the Executive, and
the Judiciary have approvingly endorsed this quasi-executive body since the
beginning of the republic.43 As he puts it: modern government was “created and
limited by the sustained and bipartisan action of Congress and the President over
40. For scholarly discussion on the legislative/non-legislative distinction and further analysis
of what powers executive branch agencies actually exercise, interested readers might compare the
writings of Professor Vermeule and Gary Lawson. See generally Adrian Vermeule, ‘No’ Review
of Philip Hamburger, ‘Is Administrative Law Unlawful?’, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1547 (2015); see also
Gary Lawson, Mr. Gorsuch, Meet Mr. Marshall: A Private-Law Framework for the Public-Law
Puzzle of Subdelegation, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (forthcoming 2021), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3607159.
41. See supra note 16; see also HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra
note 17, at 378 (“The subdelegation problem thus arises primarily where Congress authorizes others
to make legally binding rules, for this binding rulemaking, by its nature and by constitutional grant,
is legislative.”). Encapsulated, the objection is that, at its most basic, “legislative” power is the
authority to make laws—”law” being the “solemn expression of legislative will” and a rule that
commands human behavior. Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY ONLINE (2d ed). That
administrative state advocates nominally consider such authority as executive, does not change the
facts on the ground that agencies are writing their own rules of primary behavior that carry profound
legal consequence for regulated parties. If this is true, administrative agencies are exercising de
facto legislative power. That Congress confers on agencies this capacity to exercise legally binding
edicts, by definition, suffices as a delegation of power that the People intended only Congress
possess. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. To the extent that advocates of the administrative state rely
on the distinction between legislative and executive authority to deny the delegation issue, they
overlook the reality that administrative agencies are doing precisely what Congress was authorized
to do. Call it rulemaking, regulating, or “fill[ing] up the details,” what are agencies doing but
legislating by any other name? Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825).
42. See supra notes 16, 20.
43. Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, supra note 16. While this assertion may be factually
correct—indeed, Congress has endorsed the administrative regime by virtue of its initial creation
and continued channeling of authority into federal agencies—there is much debate about the chasm
of dissimilarity between the form of executive administration at the founding and its current model,
which raises questions of whether the modern form is legitimate based on a supposed heritage of
Congressional approval. See generally EPSTEIN, DUBIOUS MORALITY, supra note 1, Part 2
(cataloguing the evolution of the administrative state from early American history, through the
Constitutional revolution of 1936 Supreme Court term, to the present form); Cf. JERRY L.
MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF
AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012) (identifying administrative functions of the executive
branch and related body of administrative law formulated since the earliest days of the republic).
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time [and] blessed by an enduring bipartisan consensus on the Supreme Court.
The classical Constitution of separated powers, cooperating in joint lawmaking
across all three branches, itself gave rise to the administrative state.”44
To support this claim, Vermeule notes that Congress has endorsed the
administrative state by enacting the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).45
So too, bipartisan and independently elected Presidents evince the executive
branch’s approval “[b]y shaping and constraining the behavior of the
administrative state” through appointment and removal, oversight, and political
influence.46 In fact, Vermeule argues, “presidents of both parties, including
Ronald Reagan, have been enthusiastic promoters and protectors of the
administrative state’s major accomplishments[.]”47 Third, the Supreme Court—
on all but two occasions—has blessed the growth of the administrative state
through non-enforcement and reformulation of the nondelegation doctrine over
the decades, suggesting that no strict limitation on conferral of power to the
executive branch was ever enforced.48 The Court has also endorsed the APA as
having “settle[d] long-continued and hard-fought contentions, and enact[ed] a
formula upon which opposing social and political forces have come to rest,”
which Vermeule accepts as an endorsement of the administrative state itself.49
To make these arguments, however, assumes that these branches are capable,
independently or collectively, of conferring such legitimacy, a contestable
proposition that will be discussed in subsequent sections.
In addition to State approval, Professor Vermeule argues that widespread
public approval equally validates the administrative state.50 In his view, that
both political parties have nominated and elected and reelected candidates—like
former President Barack Obama—who are “strong advocates of the
administrative state” is adequate indicia of a “nation comfortable with
technocratic governance.”51 This “deep, widespread, and sustained popular
approval” is also apparently evinced in both political parties’ “enthusiastic
promot[ion] and protect[ion] of the administrative state’s major
accomplishments, including clean air, clean water, Social Security, and product
safety.”52 There is no “widespread illegitimacy crisis” facing our modern form
of government, the argument goes, because “the administrative state is pretty
44. Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, supra note 16.
45. Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, supra note 16.
46. Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, supra note 16.
47. Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, supra note 16.
48. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 20, at 1722; Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, supra
note 16.
49. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950); see SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE,
supra note 24, at 30.
50. Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, supra note 16; see also Farina, Deconstructing
Nondelegation, supra note 25, at 101 (referencing without citing public opinion polls broadly in
favor of a strong administrative state generally).
51. Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, supra note 16.
52. Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, supra note 16.
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much what our republic wants.”53 What other genuine basis of legitimacy could
there be, but that “almost everyone likes it?”54 In short, popular approval is said
to be the measure of legitimacy.55 There are certainly rebuttals to this
philosophical assertion. But leaving the philosophical query aside for purposes
of this article, the argument fails, on one hand, because there is simply not
enough evidence offered in support of this alleged fact of general public
approval of the administrative state.56 Even if the evidence were abundant, this
article attempts to demonstrate why, based on agency law principles, the mere
fact of tripartite support plus positive public opinion is not enough to confer
legitimacy in our American system of government.
In sum, Professor Vermeule’s approval arguments can be summarized as
follows: notwithstanding the constitutionally suspect Congressional delegation
of legislative authority to executive branch agencies, the State and the public
have both offered post hoc endorsement of the administrative state, by which its
legitimacy is established. Framed this way, the Approval Defense amounts to
an argument of ratification—the basic principle that unauthorized actions taken
by an otherwise valid agent may be retroactively validated by the one who
possesses original authorization for such acts.57 Given this agency law-derived
argument, this article responds in similar terms and legal principles to analyze
the Approval Defense and its theory of legitimacy by ratification.58
III. AGENCY LAW & THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
To frame the conversation, following is a set of basic agency law principles,
definitions, and applications to the modern system of American government. At
the end of this section, it should be clear that the legal concept of an agency
relationship is well-suited to reflect and analyze the structure of our political
system in general, and to discuss the Approval Defense in particular.
53. Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, supra note 16.
54. Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, supra note 16.
55. Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, supra note 16. Professor Vermeule makes the point
that public approval has substantial weight in the question of legitimacy because, as he puts it:
[U]nless we are willing to subscribe to a strictly normative conception of legitimacy –
which would have the odd consequence that the administrative state might be stamped
‘illegitimate’ even if almost everyone likes it – we will have to admit that deep,
widespread and sustained popular approval of the administrative state contributes to
legitimacy.
Id. And while Professor Vermeule’s argument is logically compelling, in a system of government
that upholds the Constitution as the ultimate law, the answer is: yes, a strictly normative conception
of legitimacy—that defines legitimate as in accordance with the rule of law—is precisely what we
must be willing to subscribe to.
56. See supra notes 52–57 and accompanying text.
57. See infra Part III.
58. Professor Cynthia A. Farina has done a similar exercise, applying common law agency
principles to the issue of nondelegation specifically and concluded that, understood in these terms,
the practical realities of modern administrative government does not offend traditional principles
of delegation. See Farina, Deconstructing Nondelegation, supra note 25, at 89–95.

390

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 71:377

A. Principles & Application
1. Basics of the Agency Relationship: Parties & Purpose
To begin, a few necessary terms: (1) agency; (2) principal; and (3) agent.
Agency is defined as “the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a
‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall
act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent
manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”59 Forming an agency
relationship requires three elements: (1) the principal’s manifestation that the
agent will act on the principal’s behalf and for its benefit; (2) consent by the
agent act as such; and (3) a mutual understanding between the parties that the
principal retains control of the relationship.60 Succinctly, an agency relationship
is a consensual framework within which two parties agree that the agent will act
on behalf and in the interest of the principal.61 In this arrangement, the agent is
vested with authority to act on the principal’s behalf and may affect the
principal’s rights and liabilities through the agent’s conduct.62 And as the one
that confers authority and whose rights and obligations are to be effected, the
principal ultimately retains the control to limit the scope of the agency
relationship or to terminate it altogether.63
The agency relationship is not, however, necessarily limited exclusively to the
two parties and may be expanded to include additional subagents.64 A subagent
is an appointee of the original agent and, through delegation of the agent’s
authority to the subagent, becomes similarly responsible to and capable of acting
on the principal’s behalf.65 This subagency arrangement is only proper, though,
where the principal has explicitly or implicitly conferred authority on the agent
to appoint subagents.66
2. The People & the State as Principal & Agent
America’s republican form of government was established on the
foundational understanding that “Governments are instituted among Men,
deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed.”67 At its core, this
concept recognizes that the People possess rights, including that of self-rule, that
predate the institution itself and are thus, collectively, the “sovereign” capable
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006).
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1958).
61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c, d (AM. L. INST. 2006).
62. § 1.01 cmt. c.
63. Id.
64. § 3.15 cmt. b.
65. § 3.15(1), (2) cmt. b. “The relationships between a subagent and the appointing agent and
between the subagent and the appointing agent’s principal are relationships of agency as stated in
§ 1.01.” § 3.15(1).
66. See § 2.01 cmt. b; § 3.15(2), cmt. b.
67. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
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of conferring power on others. Upon this understanding, the nation’s founders
created a tripartite system—consisting of legislative, executive, and judicial
branches (collectively, “the State”)—designed to limit and disaggregate
governing power among the three distinctive bodies, each vested with a
particular function.68 In the political arrangement then, the People— while
acting in their collective, sovereign capacity and not individually or in special
interest minority groups—function as the principal, with the tripartite branches
as the agents. Though some suggest this is too simplistic a view of our form of
government, it is nonetheless an authentic description of the historic, traditional
conception of the American system, which ultimately recognizes sovereignty as
residing with the People.69 And this conception makes it easy to frame the
American system in agency law terms.
This democratic arrangement functionally creates an agency relationship by
satisfying each requisite element—manifestation, consent, and mutual
agreement. First, the People, those possessing inherent rights to selfgovernance, have manifested—by organizing and instituting the governmental
system to promote security and protect their rights—their intent that the State
will act on their behalf and for their benefit in specific, enumerated areas of
governance.70 Second, the State—by and through its own agents, elected
officials who take oaths of office to uphold the constitutional agreement—has
consented to act on the People’s behalf.71 Third, both parties share a mutual
understanding—evidenced in the written agreement and the oaths taken to
uphold it—that the People retain ultimate control of the relationship.72 Under
this formulation all parties have a clear place in the formulated agency
relationship.
68. See CATO INSTITUTE, The American Founders, https://www.cato.org/research/americanfounders (last visited Nov. 8, 2021). See also USAGOV, Branches of the U.S. Government,
https://www.usa.gov/branches-of-government (last visited Nov. 15, 2020) (noting the Legislative
branch makes laws, the executive branch ensures their enforcement, while the Judicial branch
interprets their constitutionality).
69. This conception of “We the People” as ultimate sovereigns was well-established at the
founding. For example, see James Wilson’s comments at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention.
James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (McMaster,
et al., eds., 1787), https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch2s14.html (“[T]he
truth is, that the supreme, absolute and uncontrollable authority, remains with the people.”).
Certainly, there is substantial opposition to this theoretical conception of popular sovereignty, but
that dispute over political theory is beyond the scope of this article. For purposes here, it is assumed
that ultimate sovereignty lay with the People in their collective capacity before institution of
government and that subsequent acts by individuals or groups does not rise to the level of sovereign
action.
70. We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare,
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
71. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
72. See generally U.S. CONST.; see also U.S. CONST., art. I, II, III (vesting clauses); U.S.
CONST. art. VI (required oath of office).
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The question then arises: what of the administrative state? Federal
administrative agencies are considered a part of the executive branch with the
purpose of supporting and carrying out the work of the President, who would be
otherwise incapable of fulfilling his constitutional duties. Given that agencies
are subordinate to the President, they would seem to function, theoretically at
least, as subagents of the Executive.73 This assertion is not as straightforward as
it first appears, however, and is precisely what invites such fierce debate over
the administrative state’s legitimacy.74 Because of limited space and for the sake
of argument, this article accepts the general characterization of federal agencies
as executive branch entities, and therefore classifies them as executive
subagents. Problems that arise from this classification will be discussed below.
B. The Nature of the Relationship
1. Fiduciary Duties, Scope of the Agency Relationship & Contract
The bounds of the agency relationship are determined in part by fiduciary
duties inherent to the relationship itself, which, among other things, require the
agent to act in the principal’s interest.75 The scope of the agency relationship is
vital because, where the agent exceeds its authority, that action is deemed invalid
and not binding on the principal.76 The parties can also specifically shape the
73. BALLOTPEDIA, Administrative State, supra note 2.
74. There is another historic debate within legal academia regarding the extent to which the
Chief Executive of the United States, the President, actually possesses power to control the entire
executive branch. Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1165–68 (1992). On one side, this debate,
known as the “Unitary Executive” theory, has scholarly advocates who argue that the President is
vested with all executive power, such that he has total control of the executive branch and that any
conferral of discretionary authority in federal agencies is therefore unconstitutional. Id. On the
other side, detractors of this theory argue that such a theory is a “convenient fiction” that arose in
response to the decentralization of executive power into administrative agencies. Sanford Levinson
& Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789,
1841–42 (2010); Stephen Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A
Developmental Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2070, 2073 (2009); See
also Jonathan Turley, The Rise of the Fourth Branch of Government, WASH. POST (May 24, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-rise-of-the-fourth-branch-ofgovernment/2013/05/24/c7faaad0-c2ed-11e2-9fe2-6ee52d0eb7c1_story.html (suggesting that
administrative agencies are actually not all that accountable to or controlled by the executive branch
of which they are supposedly a part). If this opposition to the Unitary Executive theory is correct,
then administrative agencies, if not to be deemed unconstitutional, must be accepted as subagents
of the President.
75. The fiduciary nature of the relationship means that the agent is duty-bound “to act loyally
for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship,” and is thus limited
to conduct that is in the principal’s interest. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (AM. L.
INST. 2006). Agency relationship contract interpretation is governed by general rules of contract
law. § 8.07. For a discussion of other duties between agent and principal, see §§ 8.01, et seq.
76. See, e.g., First Tenn. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 501 F. App’x 255,
260 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The principal is liable for the actions of the agent committed within the scope
of authority, but not for actions outside the scope of the agent’s authority.”).
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scope of their relationship via contractual agreement.77 Such contracts, though
not controlling where the principal otherwise expressly or implicitly expands the
agent’s power, hold substantial weight in determining the scope of an agent’s
actual authority and are generally interpreted in such a way to effectuate the
intent and desires of the principal.78 Though it is not required for the formation
of an agency relationship, parties very frequently rely on such contracts to
delineate the scope and terms of their relationship given the implications that
such an arrangement carries, particularly for the principal.79
2. The Constitution as Contract
In the American system, the Constitution is the contract through which the
parties—the People and their governmental agents—have delineated the scope
of their agency relationship. Professor Randy Barnett, sounding in contractual
concepts, aptly defines the Constitution as “the law that governs those that
govern us.”80 This constitutional contract prescribes the terms on which the
principal delegates its right to self-rule and on which the government’s existence
depends, and it outlines the type of authority that is vested with each agent—
with lawmaking powers in Congress, executive and enforcement powers in the
President, and adjudicatory powers in the courts of law.81 To fulfill its inherent
fiduciary duty to the People, then, the State must “act in accordance with the
express and implied terms” of the Constitution, and must act in a manner to
secure the People’s interest rather than its own. These contractual principles
carry particular weight when it comes to the principle of delegation.
C. On Delegation
1. Common Law Principle of Delegation
The familiar maxim delegata potestas non potest delagari is a wellestablished concept in agency law meaning that a delegated authority cannot be
further delegated.82 The agency relationship exists via delegation of the

77. § 1.01 cmt. c, e, h; § 8.01, cmt. c.
78. See § 2.02 cmt. c. “If the principal has stated the agent’s authority in a formal written
instrument, the formality of the statement itself is relevant to, and often dispositive” in determining
an agent’s actual scope of authority. Id. (emphasis added).
79. See § 8.07 cmt. b.
80. Randy Barnett, We the People: Each and Every One, 123 YALE L.J. 2576, 2588 (2014).
81. U.S. CONST., art. I, II & III.
82. Horst K. Ehmke, “Delegata Potestas Non Potest Delegari” A Maxim of American
Constitutional Law, 47 Cornell L.R. 50, 50–51, 51 n.11 (1961). The verb “to delegate” is defined
as: “to send or appoint (a person) as deputy or representative; to commit (powers, functions, etc.)
to another as agent or deputy.” Delegate, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/
browse/delegate?s=t (last visited Jan. 15, 2021). See also J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 405–06 (1928) (noting the well-established pedigree of the doctrine in agency
law and recognizing its even broader application in the constitutional context); RESTATEMENT
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principal’s own authority to the agent and the agent, possessing no inherent
authority of his own, cannot subdelegate this authority unless expressly or
implicitly permitted.83 Thus, while the agent may be able to enlist help in
pursuing the principal’s goals, the agent cannot convey anything other than the
authority than he actually possesses to subagents.84 Here again, a contract
clearly defining the scope of the agency relationship is helpful to delineate
whether the agent has authority to appoint subagents without leaving opportunity
for ambiguity on that point.
2. Delegation in the Modern Administrative State
When it comes to the administrative state, the delegation issue is hotly
contested and tends to form the locus of the debate, but usually raises the
constitutional nondelegation doctrine, which will not be addressed here.
Instead, a basic application of the agency law principle of nondelegation to the
plain contractual language of the Constitution—which designates particular
kinds of authority to its distinct agents (Congress, the Executive, and Courts)—
demonstrates that the agents, having been delegated their authority by the
People, may not then subdelegate their authority elsewhere unless expressly
authorized or implicitly required.
To this, some contend, Congress is implicitly authorized to subdelegate
powers to federal agencies on the grounds that these agencies are necessary to
assist the Executive in fulfilling its constitutional duties.85 Alternatively, it is
argued, the “Necessary and Proper Clause,” provides the Congressional agent—
if not express at least implicit—authority to subdelegate powers to
administrative agencies.86 There is inadequate room here to discuss the
delegation issue in detail. However, as with the Approval Defense more
broadly, a basic application of principles of contractual interpretation—

(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 18 (AM. L. INST. 1958). For our purposes above, however, “delegation”
is used only as an agency principle and does not reference the constitutional doctrine.
83. § 18 cmt. d; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.02 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2006);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY §§ 79, 80 (AM. L. INST. 1933); Mill St. Church of Christ v.
Hogan, 785 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990) (“In examining whether implied authority exists,
it is important to focus upon the agent’s understanding of his authority. . . . The nature of the task
or job may be another factor to consider. Implied authority may be necessary in order to implement
the express authority.”) (citing 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Agency § 75)).
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 17 (AM. L. INST. 1958). This rule rests on the
understanding that a conferral of power on the agent to act on the principal’s behalf necessarily
carries with it an inherent degree of discretion, and that such discretionary authority—expressly
vested in the agent—may not be handed to someone other than the specific person to which the
principal entrusted it. § 17 cmt. a, b, c.
85. See Farina, Deconstructing Nondelegation, supra note 25, at 92–93 (“broad grants of
regulatory power to administrative agencies can be justified as [‘necessary’] subdelegations” that
are achieved through the constitutionally ordained political process and remain ever subject to
control of the People).
86. See id.
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derivative of agency law—help dissolve those challenges.87 For purposes of this
article and as addressed below,88 it is assumed that here Congress has in fact
delegated its authority to the executive branch agencies, an invalid action apart
from the otherwise clear contractual language of the Constitution, thus requiring
ratification if such conduct is to be remedied.
D. The Ratification Problem
1. The Principle of Ratification
That agents sometimes act outside the scope of their authority is an inevitable
fact, but one that can be resolved through ratification, or approval of the agent’s
unlawful act by the principal.89 As previously stated, where an agent acts
without actual authority, the relevant conduct is deemed invalid.90 Thus,
whatever acts the agent undertook outside the scope of his authority are, with
respect to the principal, essentially a nullity. But a principal may—in the event
87. To start, the Constitution can be fairly read as expressly delineating the People’s intent to
convey governing authority to three separate agents, with each possessing distinctive powers.
Based on a plain reading of this explicit language, it is difficult to infer that the People intended the
executive agent, by and through its subagents—administrative agencies that possess the authority
to enact positive laws,—to also possess legislative powers. In certain contractual provisions,
moreover, the People expressly authorized their agents to exercise those powers generally reserved
to the other agents. For example, one clause gives Congress exclusive authority to conduct what
appears very much like a form of adjudicative powers in specific circumstances. U.S. CONST., art.
I, § 3 (giving the Senate the sole power to try impeachments). Applying basic principles of
contractual interpretation, thus, strongly suggests that a principal who explicitly provides
exceptions to its general provisions in one place, is certainly capable of creating such exceptions in
other places if it intended to.
To the argument that the “Necessary and Proper” clause provides the allowable inference that
agents are authorized to subdelegate their authority—and that Congress can thereby legitimately
create administrative agencies—here, it is vital to pay particular attention to the kind of authority
being delegated, because an agent that possesses only one kind of authority cannot delegate a
distinct kind of authority to a subagent. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
Accordingly, arguments of “delegation” that rely heavily on the distinction between legislative and
executive authority necessarily fail under this basic principle of agency law. Farina,
Deconstructing Nondelegation, supra note 25, at 99–100 (noting the existence of such
nondelegation arguments).
Finally, one qualification is necessary. The arguments above are not to say that if agencies are
exercising legislative authority in some form, that they must be illegitimated entirely. The agency
relationship could certainly include appointments of executive subagents that exercise only the kind
of authority that the Executive does—the power to execute the laws. Thus, to the extent that
administrative agencies are simply making pragmatic decisions with respect to enforcement of the
laws and not enacting them, they would be acting within the scope of their subagent authority. This
is all simply to note that an application of the most basic agency law-derived principle of
nondelegation disallows a “delegation” theory that can only survive by maintaining a strict
legislative-executive authority distinction.
88. See infra Part III.D.ii.
89. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.01(1) (AM. L. INST. 2006).
90. See supra notes 80 and 85 and accompanying text.
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that the agent’s unauthorized actions are desirable or beneficial—validate the
otherwise invalid acts through “ratification.”91 Ratification is effectuated when
the principal, with full capacity and knowledge of all material components of
the agent’s conduct, approves of the agent’s transgression, giving full legal and
retroactive effect to the unlawful act.92 This process requires the principal’s
clear manifestation of his intent to approve the agent’s unlawful act or otherwise
obvious conduct that reasonably indicates his approval.93 Moreover, ratification
is generally an affirmative act, limiting a finding of ratification by silence to
clear instances in which the agent is fully aware of the agent’s unlawful act and
continues to receive the benefits of the unlawful transaction without explicitly
validating the agent’s conduct.94
2. The Problem of the Administrative State
Given the basic rule that agents must act within the scope of their delegated
authority, an acute problem arises when one recognizes that federal agencies—
which we accept as executive branch subagents—have received from Congress,
another agent, not just executive authority like investigative and prosecutorial
power, but also rulemaking (quasi-legislative) and adjudicatory (quasi-judicial)
powers.95 In short, the People’s agent, Congress, has essentially delegated some
of its own authority, as well as some aspects of the other agents’ authority, to
the Executive’s subagent, creating a fourth quasi-agent possessing all forms of
governmental power that the People originally intended to disaggregate among
its agents—a clear violation of the basic principle of nondelegation outlined
above.
Recognizing this fact, the only remedy for this illegitimate conduct is
ratification by the principal. While there are, in the constitutional order,
mechanisms to discipline and revoke authority from governmental agents by
way of the political process (e.g., through the election process), a mechanism for
post hoc approval of otherwise blatantly unconstitutional acts is lacking. The
amendment provision of Article V of the Constitution, however, seems to
provide the necessary remedial mechanism to validate this sort of unlawful agent
conduct. A constitutional amendment—which requires the People to explicitly
manifest their assent through a decisive act in their super-majority, sovereign
capacity—would allow the principal to validate the agency relationship violation
that the creation of a quasi-administrative agent effectuates. Thus, if the People
so desired, they certainly could validate the administrative state through an
affirmative grant of authority on this quasi-executive branch. And though
91. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.01(1) (AM. L. INST. 2006).
92. See §§ 4.01(2)–(3), 4.02, 4.04(1) cmt. b, 4.06(1) cmt. b.
93. See § 4.01(2).
94. See, e.g., Brooks v. Bell, No. C-970548, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1476, at *16 n.18 (Apr.
10, 1998) (citing, in addition to several other jurisdictions, Reuschlein & Gregory, The Law of
Agency & Partnership (2 Ed.1990) 77, Section 33).
95. See BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 2.
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amendment is a notoriously arduous task it is not an impossible one. Indeed, the
People have manifested their intent to modify their democratic agency
relationship in this way on at least twenty-seven occasions over the course of
American history.96 In the absence of alternative processes that satisfy
ratification’s requirements like this process does, constitutional amendment
seems to be ratification’s only viable surrogate in the government-as-agency
metaphor.
IV. THE APPROVAL DEFENSE: ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
Upon consideration of the forgoing principles, the Approval Defense—which
argues for the administrative state’s legitimacy based not on its fundamental
constitutional validity but based on purported State and the People’s
retrospective “approval” of Congress’s creation—is much akin to an argument
of post hoc ratification.97 In agency terms, if the administrative state is an
unlawful act by the principal’s government agent, ratification is the only possible
remedy. Whether ratification has actually been achieved is this article’s primary
focus. Upon reviewing the Approval Defense’s evidence of State and public
approval, it is clear that the administrative state’s ratification has yet to be
demonstrated.
A. State Agents Cannot Properly Ratify Their Own Creation of the
Administrative State
As noted in Part II.B, the evidence for State approval is that over time
Congress, multiple Presidents, and the Supreme Court have, collectively and in
bipartisan fashion, endorsed the continued existence of the administrative state.
But this evidence fails to explain why such approval should be accepted as
legitimate ratification within our established framework of government. The
argument assumes that because neither Congress, any sole President, nor the
Court has abolished the administrative state, they have ratified it. Mere
participation in the tripartite system that created the administrative state—and
possibly erred in doing so—does not necessarily demonstrate unquestioned
approval of the regime, however.
A cursory historical survey demonstrates precisely the opposite of
homogeneous approval, with Congressional minorities, Presidents, and Supreme
Court Justices alike exhibiting strident—albeit insufficiently lethal—opposition
to the administrative state’s historically unhampered growth into its unwieldy
current manifestation. The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 was, itself, an
attempt to remedy the all-too-apparent problems with the administrative
regime.98 Moreover, to assert that a President like Ronald Reagan, a notorious
advocate of limited government, was supportive of the administrative state’s
96. See generally U.S. CONST., amend. I–XXVII.
97. See supra Part II.B.
98. EPSTEIN, DUBIOUS MORALITY, supra note 1, at 3–4.
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“major accomplishments” does not require the conclusion that such support
equates unadulterated approval of the administrative state in its modern form.99
Third, to say that the Supreme Court has given its judicial stamp of approval
needs further expounding. The suggestion that the Court’s continued
constitutional trend of deference, which began in the 1960s New Deal-era,
confers legitimacy ignores other judicial realities, such as stare decisis—
including the desire to maintain the public’s perception of the Court’s
legitimacy—the process of certiorari, and political gamesmanship’s influence
on the Court’s jurisprudence.100 So the evidence provided is not altogether
convincing.
But even if one is convinced by this fairly scant evidence that these
governmental agents have, in bipartisan fashion, expressed their approval of the
modern administrative state, this conclusion does not resolve the greater
question whether such approval suffices to confer legitimacy. Viewing the
administrative state problem within the framework of agency law, it is clear that
Congress, the Executive, and the Courts—agents in this context—cannot
validate their own contested actions. If these three governmental co-agents have
illegitimately acted beyond the scope of their authority by creating subagent
administrative agencies in violation of the constitutional contract that details the
proper scope of government, they cannot themselves rectify that error. The
tripartite design itself, laid out in the Constitution, supports this argument.
Within the system, each coordinate political branch is vested with limited and
99. Hedrick Smith, Reagan’s Effort to Change Course of Government, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23,
1984), https://www.nytimes.com/1984/10/23/us/reagan-s-effort-to-change-course-of-government.
html; Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, supra note 16; see also Philip Rucker & Robert Costa,
Bannon Vows a Daily Fight for “Deconstruction of the Administrative State”, WASH. POST (Feb.
23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/top-wh-strategist-vows-a-daily-fight-fordeconstruction-of-the-administrative-state/2017/02/23/03f6b8da-f9ea-11e6-bf01d47f8cf9b643_story.html (noting President Donald Trump’s extreme deregulatory agenda). In
fact, some fierce critics of the administrative state laud its valuable achievements, and do not
expressly advocate for its entire overthrow. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, DUBIOUS MORALITY, supra note
1, at 3, 33. So, to suggest that recognizing the administrative state’s beneficial accomplishments is
equivalent to wholesale endorsement is inaccurate, at best.
100. EPSTEIN, DUBIOUS MORALITY, supra note 1, at 3–4; Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 865–68 (1992):
([T]he Court cannot buy support for its decisions by spending money and, except to a
minor degree, it cannot independently coerce obedience to its decrees. The Court’s power
lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in
the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s law means
and to declare what it demands.)
(emphasis added); Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of
Certiorari: Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L. REV.
389 (2004); Gabe Roth, Supreme Court Term Limits Could Reduce Gamesmanship, Shouting,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 2, 2020, 4:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/
supreme-court-term-limits-could-reduce-gamesmanship-shouting; see generally Glen Staszewski,
Precedent and Disagreement, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1019 (2018) (reviewing RANDY J. KOZEL,
SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT (2017)).

Spring 2022]

Administrative Apparition

399

enumerated powers. These siloed powers were designed such that each branch’s
“ambition . . . be made to counteract ambition” of the others, such that concerted
political cooperation between the co-agent branches is necessarily difficult.101
To assume that such distinctive powers can therefore be shared amongst the
agents—such as lawmaking power existing in both Legislative and Executive
branches—would defeat that express delegation to distinct agents. Thus, only
the principal, the People, has capacity to ratify an action the agent took outside
the agent’s actual scope of authority. So, the mere fact that allegedly Congress,
multiple Presidents, and the Supreme Court have, over the arc of American
political history, created and “approved of” the growing administrative regime
does nothing to remedy this breach of the contractually defined agency
relationship. In sum, that the State has ratified the administrative state is an
invalid argument because agents cannot ratify their own actions.
B. No Evidence the People Have Ratified the Administrative State
The follow-up response to the immediately preceeding argument is that the
People have ratified the administrative state through the democratic process and
any outstanding doubt about such democratic approval is quelled by observing
the administrative state’s general popular approval. As it has been stated, in
Vermeule’s view, to challenge “this long-sustained and judicially-approved joint
action of Congress and the President” as an improper mechanism for conferring
constitutional legitimacy on this governmental administrative creation is not a
criticism of the administrative state, but a suggestion that the “whole
constitutional order is intrinsically misguided.”102 Thus, the argument goes, to
claim the People cannot validate the administrative state through the tripartite
outworking of the democratically-created political system that itself gave rise to
the regime is to suggest the entire enterprise is defunct. But there are multiple
problems with this assertion.
One of the primary difficulties with the constitutional agency relationship is
that the collective will of the People, after initial conferral of power on their
political agents, ceases to act except through those designated actors. The
Peoples’ constitutional act of sovereignty initiates the agency relationship and
authorizes the agents to act within their designated democratic spheres. But
because the People can act as principal only in their collective, sovereign
capacity, the principal is thereafter barred from interacting with its agents or
modifying the scope of that relationship except by constitutional amendment—
a manifestly arduous task.103 By contrast, in a traditional agency relationship
the principal can command the agent directly, modifying instructions and
amending the scope of the agent’s authority as circumstances change. In the
101. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
102. Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, supra note 16.
103. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text; see Jay Cost, The Constitution is Very
Hard to Amend (Apr. 2, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/04/united-statesconstitution-difficult-to-amend/.
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democratic process, this clear path of communication between principal and
agent, except by amendment, simply does not exist. One could argue that the
principal does in fact interact with and direct its agents through the
representative process—through constituent correspondence, elections and
recalls, and ballot initiatives, for example. But these forms of principal-to-agent
communications, operating within the scope of the principal-agent framework
as laid out in the Constitution, are better seen as correspondence, not between
the principal in its sovereign capacity, but with non-principal individuals or
groups of constituents who act to influence the agents in exercise of their
discretionary authority. This assertion rests on the understanding that, after
establishing government, individuals and small representative groups do not
represent “the People” acting in their sovereign capacity. Thus, any fundamental
change to the original agency relationship, however, must be made at the
constitutional level.
Given this complexity, to claim that the People have validated their agents’
unlawful conduct by way of the agents through whom the People must
necessarily express their approval misunderstands the nature of the problem.
Such a proposition is much like requiring a complainant, where there is no
feasible alternative mechanism, to report his complaint about his supervisor to
his supervisor because that is the general mode for reporting. Thus, to argue as
I do here that ratification of the administrative state must come through
amendment and not merely by democratic approval, is not a disavowal of the
“whole constitutional order.” It is simply a call for adherence to the only viable
process of ratification—amendment—that is necessitated by such an obvious
departure from the agency relationship’s original framework as laid out in the
constitutional contract.
Nor is the lack of a constitutional amendment evidence of the People’s
approval of an administrative state that violates its most basic contractual
precepts—namely, disaggregation of agent authority. The Constitution
implements this onerous, albeit surmountable, amendment barrier to massive
structural change, intentionally making the process to alter the original shape of
the democratic system painstakingly difficult. This fact alone supports the claim
that following that process is the only valid method to ratify a modification to
the original agency relationship that the administrative state produces.
Moreover, perhaps the People’s collective conscience has not yet fully
awakened to their agents’ unlawful conduct. And even if the People are aware
of their agent’s breach, given the amendment process’s requirements, it could
take decades for the People to muster the collective political will required to
correct or ratify that transgression.
The problems with the Approval Defense’s ratification-by-democraticapproval theory do not end there. It also overlooks the fact that our political
system is often—in-part by design—unresponsive to anything short of a drastic
convulsion of the public will. The expansive outgrowth of political interest
groups with the express purpose of helping influence policy outcomes reflects
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the reality that our representative system often struggles to effectively channel
the public will.104 Even if one accepts, for the sake of argument, that the
democratic outworking of our tripartite political system is a sufficient means to
channel the will of the People in their sovereign capacity and that the
administrative state can be validated this way, such a proposition does not prove
that the system has actually achieved this outcome. There still exists the
plausible objection that the structure of our democratic political system is
vulnerable to misuse and, for this reason, has either prevented the People’s
resolution of the question of administrative state or has provided a distorted
answer to that question.
Public choice theory, and in particular Bruce Yandle’s Bootleggers and
Baptists theory—an economic tool that seeks to explain supply and demand in
the social regulatory context—helps demonstrate how this is so.105 In Yandle’s
theory, “Baptists” are the proponents of a certain policy whose political action
derives from a sense of moral conviction.106 “Bootleggers” are those who,
“expect[ing] to profit from the very regulatory restrictions desired by Baptists,
grease the political machinery with some of their expected proceeds,” thus
funding the desired policy outcomes in the same way an individual in the private
sector makes short-term investments to achieve long-term dividends.107
Applying Yandle’s theory more broadly to the question of the modern
administrative state, it is easy to identify several figurative Bootleggers and
Baptists with plausible reasons, either economic or philosophical, to maintain
the current regime and prevent the People from upending the governmental
status quo even if they wished to. A few examples will have to suffice. The
most obvious Bootleggers who stand to gain from the maintenance of the
administrative state are the federal agencies themselves who have both
104. See Wallach, supra note 16, at 3–4.
105. Bruce Yandle, Viewpoint: Bootleggers and Baptists–The Education of a Regulatory
Economist, 7 REGULATION 12, 13–14 (1983):
[T]his theory is not new. In a democratic society, economic forces will always play
through the political mechanism in ways determined by the voting mechanism employed.
Politicians need resources in order to get elected. Selected members of the public can
gain resources through the political process, and highly organized groups can do that
quite handily.
See also Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect, 22 REGULATION 5, 5 (1999);
William Dubinsky, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1512, 1512–
1513 (1992) (reviewing DANIEL A. FARBER AND PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991) (“[P]ublic choice theory challenges the traditional assumption
that government operates in the public interest. Instead, [it] views the policymaking process as a
battlefield where legislators, bureaucrats, interest groups, and individual voters compete to
maximize their own private interests.”). Public choice helps explain how private interest group’s
economic incentives play a role in the public arena. For an insightful case study analyzing special
interests’ effect on the regulatory landscape of New York’s taxi-cab industry, see generally Jeremy
Kidd, J.D., Ph.D., Who’s Afraid of Uber, 20 NEV. L.J. 581 (2020).
106. Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect, supra note 107, at 5.
107. Id.
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theoretically discernable and verifiable incentives to expand the scope of their
authority, increase their budgets, and perpetuate their own existence.108 The
other obvious category of Bootleggers, among potential others, are the
legislative representatives who stand to gain insulation from backlash over
controversial political decisions that are more easily delegated to federal
agencies.109 The pro-administrativist Baptists are just as easily identified.
Indeed, there are many political theorists, historic and contemporary, who laud
the administrative state and advocate for its continuance on account of its
benefits for the public welfare.110
In summary, there are multiple shortcomings to the ratification-by-publicapproval argument, which is the Approval Defense’s only viable theory when
agency law principles are applied. To simply declare that the democratic process
itself provides the means to validate the administrative state does not prove that
it has, in fact, been validated through that process. And the evidence offered to
compel the conclusion that it has is altogether lacking.111 Thus, to alter the
original tripartite constitutional framework, the People must change the agency
contract by amendment. This is no easy task. It is not impossible, however,
given that the People have done so on multiple occasions and in fairly recent
history.112 If the People wished to authorize the creation of the administrative
state through ratification via the amendment process, they certainly could.
Clearly, they have yet to do so. And until they do, the administrative state’s
question of legitimacy remains.
CONCLUSION
The administrative state’s crisis of legitimacy is an enduring problem, despite
the intense desire of many academics who wish to lay the issue to rest. For many
Americans, the looming threat of an unwieldy, unaccountable, and everexpanding regime of federal agencies with power to write, prosecute, and
adjudicate their own rules elicits an uneasiness that will not be assuaged with
108. See generally Necessary & Proper Episode 45: Agency Rule-making: Unnecessary
Delegation or Indispensable Assistance?, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY (July 18, 2019),
https://fedsoc.org/commentary/podcasts/necessary-proper-episode-45-agency-rule-makingunnecessary-delegation-or-indispensable-assistance.
109. Id.
110. For example, Woodrow Wilson openly justified the administrative state on the grounds
that the public interest is better entrusted to the elites. See Wilson, supra note 20, at 199–201, 209
(“The bulk of mankind is rigidly unphilosophical, and nowadays the bulk of mankind votes.”). The
Approval Defense’s proponent lauds the administrative state on precisely these grounds. See
Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 52–58 and accompanying text.
112. U.S. CONST., amend. XXVII (ratified in 1992); Steven G. Calabresi & Zephyr Teachout,
The Twenty-Seventh Amendment, CONSTITUTION CENTER, https://constitutioncenter.org/
interactive-constitution/interpretation/amendment-xxvii/interps/165#:~:text=The%20Twenty%
2DSeventh%20Amendment%20was%20accepted%20as%20a%20validly%20ratified,ever%20sec
ond%2Dguess%20that%20decision (last visited Jan. 15, 2021).
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vague assurances that“the administrative state is pretty much what our republic
wants.”113 But concerns about administrative power is not the exclusive reason
for all the discord. The problem lies in the fact that no explanation for this
monstrous growth of federal expansion has yet been satisfactory to the public
who have, by their democratic acquiescence, allegedly validated its existence.
If the People are expected to come to terms with the fact that they have already
relinquished—by retrospective approval—their right to self-governance and
placed it in the State’s hands to dispense indeterminately amongst federal
agencies, the fact of such ratification needs to be proven, not merely asserted.
Until proponents of the Approval Defense can demonstrate convincingly that the
People have unequivocally validated their agents’ unlawful transgression, this
fight over the administrative state’s legitimacy will simply not go to its grave.

113. Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, supra note 16.
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